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Fear: A Story in Three Parts
Rachel F. Moran*
"[Flor the last few years I have been highly conscious that from now on I am
preparing to die, and must think about it, and try to do it well. When I was young
death was a romantic dream, longed for at times of great emotional stress as one
longs for sleep. Who could fear it? one asked at nineteen. We fear what we can-
not imagine. There is simply no way of imagining what has not yet happened nor
been described. We live toward it, not knowing ... "I
May Sarton wrote these lines when she was 61, but today many men and
women serving in America's armed forces are contemplating the prospect of
death at an early age. They must imagine the unimaginable and find ways to
cope. Army Pfc. Jesse A. Givens of Springfield, Missouri, coped by writing a
letter to his family to be opened in the event of his death. In addition to his
wife Melissa, he wrote to his six-year-old stepson Dakota and his son Carson
(nicknamed Bean) who was born while he was stationed in Iraq. Here are
excerpts from that letter:
My family,
I never thought that I would be writing a letter like this. I really
don't know where to start. I've been getting bad feelings, though
and, well, if you are reading this....
The happiest moments in my life all deal with my little family. I
will always have with me the small moments we all shared. The
moments when you quit taking life so serious and smiled. The
sounds of a beautiful boy's laughter or the simple nudge of a baby
unborn. You will never know how complete you have made me.
You saved me from loneliness and taught me how to think beyond
myself. You taught me how to live and to love. You opened my
eyes to a world I never dreamed existed.
* Robert D. and Leslie-Kay Raven Professor of Law, University of California
School of Law (Boalt Hall). I would like to thank Jennifer K. Robbennolt and Chris-
tina E. Wells for inviting me to participate in this symposium on "Fear and Risk in
Times of Democratic Crisis" at the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law.
Their efforts as well as the support provided by the law school made this an extremely
memorable anl'worthwhile event.
1. MAY SARTON, THE HOUSE BY THE SEA: A JOURNAL 53 (1977) (emphasis
added).
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I am sorry. I did not want to have to write this letter. There is so
much more I need to say, so much more I need to share. A life-
time's worth. I married you for a million lifetimes. That's how
long I will be with you. Please keep my babies safe. Please find it
in your heart to forgive me for leaving you alone.... Teach our
babies to live life to the fullest, tell yourself to do the same.
I will always be there with you, Melissa. I will always want you,
need you and love you, in my heart, my mind and my soul. Do me
a favor, after you tuck the children in. Give them hugs and kisses





On May 1, 2003, Pfc. Givens died at the age of 34 when his tank fell into the
Euphrates after a riverbank gave way. On November 11, 2003, this letter to
his family was published in the New York Times.
2
Pfc. Givens' letter is a story about fear in three parts. The first is when
only he knows about the letter, as it remains tucked away among his belong-
ings unopened and unsent. If Givens lives, he can destroy the letter or share it
with his family as he chooses. If he dies, it is a kind of emotional insurance
policy, should he not have the chance to say what he felt during long distance
calls in which perhaps he could not find the right words. The second is when
Givens' family reads the letter after he is killed. This is a communication
seemingly from beyond the grave, a way of preserving emotional connections
even as relationships among husband, wife, and children are irrevocably rup-
tured by an untimely death. The third is when the letter is published in the
New York Times for perfect strangers to read. Though they do not know Jesse,
Melissa, Dakota, or Carson Givens, many of these readers will be moved by
this letter for reasons even they themselves do not fully understand.
Here, I want to reflect on this story of fear in three parts as a way to un-
derstand emotion as part of a private experience, an interpersonal communi-
cation, and a public event. As this story will show, fear can be defined in
purely cognitive terms. In fact, efforts to equate fear with information proc-
essing, that is, risk assessment, have been especially prominent in recent
years. Alternatively, fear can be defined as "cognition plus." That is, cogni-
2. The Things They Wrote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at A23.
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tion is relevant but something more is required to understand fear filly.3
These competing approaches are in conflict only to the extent that cognitivists
assert that their analysis is a comprehensive one. The cognitive approach is
perhaps most appealing when fear remains an interior experience, yet even
here an exclusive focus on beliefs and propositions can be challenged. As the
focus shifts to interpersonal settings, doubts about a purely cognitive ap-
proach become more salient, though cognitivists continue to defend their
position. In the public domain, there is a push to return to a highly abstract
account of fear as pure risk assessment, but here too there are powerful calls
to complicate the analysis of emotion's role in collective decision making.
I. A LETTER UNOPENED: THE MEANING OF EMOTION
If any of us were asked to explain what motivated Jesse Givens' letter,
we would likely rely on his fear of death. In anticipation of being killed, Giv-
ens prepared a message that covers a range of emotional terrain, including not
just fear but love, empathy, remorse, and regret. The word "emotion" is itself
based on the idea of a "moving out,'A and here our commonsense surmise is
that fear is the prime mover, prompting Givens to engage in introspection and
to put his sentiments into writing. Yet, what precisely do we mean by fear?
As S.J. Rachman points out, "The wordfear is used without difficulty in every-
day language to mean the experience of apprehension, but problems arise
when it is used as a scientific term." 5 In sifting through these problems to tell
the story of fear in three parts, I will not attempt to resolve how emotion
should be defined in all contexts and for all purposes. Instead, I will limit
myself to analyzing how competing definitions of fear might relate to the law.
Here, what seems critical is that proponents of both pure cognition and cogni-
tion plus move beyond definitions of emotion that focus on biological and
reflexive processes. Each school of thought allows room for conscious
awareness and control, conditions that make the imposition of social values
and legal judgments plausible.6
3. NORL CARROLL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HORROR OR PARADOXES OF THE HEART
25-27 (1990); PETER GOLDIE, THE EMOTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 18-19
(2000); DAVID PUGMIRE, REDISCOVERING EMOTION 7-16 (1998). In addition, there has
been disagreement about whether to include action within the definition of emotion.
For a sense of this debate, see ROBERT C. ROBERTS, EMOTIONS: AN ESSAY IN AID OF
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 157-76 (2003).
4. CARROLL, supra note 3, at 24; PUGMIRE, supra note 3, at 1-3.
5. S.J. RACHMAN, FEAR AND COURAGE 2 (2d ed. 1990).
6. Cass Sunstein adopts a similar approach when he treats fear as a cognitive
error in analyzing its role in regulation but refuses to resolve "vigorous debates about
whether an emotion is a form of thought, whether thoughts are necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for emotions, and whether emotions in a sense precede or outrun
cognition." Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1140
(2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)).
2004] 1015
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Debates about the role of cognition build on a general agreement that
biological processes play a foundational role in emotional life. Fear is a par-
ticularly good example. Neuroscientists have identified the amygdala, a small
almond-shaped mass of nerves in the brain, as the seat of fear.7 There are two
pathways to exciting the amygdala, one via the sensory cortex and the other
via the sensory thalamus. The sensory cortex relies on fairly detailed percep-
tions to trigger a reaction; as a result, it takes a while for information to be
processed and prompt the response of fear. 9 The sensory thalamus is a "quick
and dirty reaction mechanism" that activates fear based on only a crude per-
ception of danger.' 0 This potentially lifesaving system enables you to be
frightened of a snake before fully realizing that it is a snake." Once you fear
the snake, you are apt to react by jumping away, the product of complex in-
teractions between the amygdala and the corticostriatal motor system that
remain something of a mystery in the neuroscientific world.12
The instinct to jump away may be an automatic response, one that does
not depend on a deliberative decision. 3 Indeed, according to leading neuro-
scientists, implicit emotional memory operates without conscious awareness
and is critical in the learning process that leads to conditioned fear.' 4 Yet,
explicit memories of emotional experiences also play a significant role in
shaping our emotional lives. These memories are a product of "the co-
representation in awareness of the conscious memory [of an event] and the
current emotional arousal [due to implicit memory that] give an emotional
flavoring to the conscious memory."' 15 This conscious awareness makes it
7. JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS
OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 157-59 (1996) [hereinafter LEDOUx, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN];
Joseph LeDoux, Fear and the Brain: Where Have We Been, and Where Are We Go-
ing?, 44 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1229, 1229-32 (1998) [hereinafter LeDoux, Fear
and the Brain].
8. LEDOUx, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN, supra note 7, at 163-65.
9. Id.
10. Joseph LeDoux, Emotion, Memory and the Brain, ScI. AM., June 1994, at 50,
55-56.
11. LEDOUx, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN, supra note 7, at 161-65; LeDoux, supra
note 10, at 52-54.
12. LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN, supra note 7, at 174-76; LeDoux, Fear
and the Brain, supra note 7, at 1234.
13. LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN, supra note 7, at 175-76. Debate persists
about whether emotional automaticity is a genuine phenomenon. This debate need not
be resolved to undertake an analysis of the relevance of fear to the law. Because law
is concerned with emotions that involve at least some elements of cognitive aware-
ness, the rare instance of an automatic response is not particularly germane to the
discussion.
14. Id. at 181-82, 196-97; see also Daniel L. Schacter & Peter Graf, Effects of
Elaborative Processing on Implicit and Explicit Memory for New Associations, 12 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 432, 442-43 (1986).
15. LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN, supra note 7, at 201.
1016 [Vol. 69
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/7
FEAR: A STORYIN THREE PARTS
possible to supplement emotional automaticity, that is, unconscious reactions,
with emotional plans, which are a product of thought and deliberation. 16 As
Joseph LeDoux explains:
Emotional plans are a wonderful addition to emotional automatic-
ity. They allow us to be emotional actors, rather than just reactors.
But the capacity to make this switch has a price. Once you start
thinking, not only do you try to figure the best thing to do in the
face of several possible next moves that a predator (including a so-
cial predator) is likely to make, you also think about what will
happen if the plan fails. Bigger brains allow bigger plans, but for
these you pay in the currency of anxiety .... 17
It is clear from Givens' letter that he acted thoughtfully and deliberately as an
emotional actor, not simply as a reactor to an immediate threat. It is also plain
that he paid the price that LeDoux describes, as he contemplated dangers yet
to be encountered and harms yet to be realized. For, by moving beyond the
realm of the implicit and unconscious, Givens clearly relied on cognition,
including the power of imagination, to grasp the possibility of his own death.
Sentiments rooted in conscious thought implicate legal concerns because
individuals can be held accountable for the emotional plans that they make. In
evaluating these complex emotional experiences, some theorists focus exclu-
sively on cognition. For example, in analyzing the impact of popular anxieties
on the regulatory process, Cass R. Sunstein concludes that fear results from
laypeople's reliance on cognitive heuristics, mental shortcuts that lead to dis-
torted risk estimates. 18 Although people may rationally choose to use rules of
thumb to save time and resources, their inaccurate perceptions lead to mis-
guided decision making. 19 Based on Sunstein's account, fear becomes noth-
ing more than "a fertile field for cognitive mistakes." 20
Consider the case of Givens' letter. To conclude that Givens was moti-
vated by fear, Sunstein must find that the soldier misperceived the danger of
death. The fact that Givens actually died after writing the letter is no guaran-
tee that he properly apprehended the risk beforehand. For instance, Sunstein
might worry that Givens was influenced by "'the social amplification of
risk,' ' 21 that is, the tendency of people with little independent knowledge to
rely heavily on others' beliefs. These beliefs can be especially powerful when
they are aided by "reputational cascades" that lead individuals to agree lest
16. Id. at 201, 203.
17. Id. at 177.
18. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1127-28.
19. Id. at 1123-24.
20. Rachel F. Moran, Fear Unbound. A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 42
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 4 (2002).
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they be labeled out of touch or unreasonable. 22 In fact, psychologists have
documented fear by contagion on the battlefront. That is, "[f]rightened peo-
ple, especially leaders, can trigger widespread fear." 23 So, it is quite possible,
though by no means certain, that Givens' fears were exaggerated. Yet, if Giv-
ens correctly assessed the risk of being killed, Sunstein is unable to say that
Givens was afraid despite a letter stating that he had been "getting bad feel-
ings." Such a conclusion seems to be at odds with Givens' interior experi-
ence, at least as expressed in the message to his family. This is an anomaly
rooted in the equation of fear with mistaken beliefs. As Eric Posner notes, this
approach is dubious precisely because fear rooted in heuristics and "cascades
would occur even in a hypothetical world in which people had no emo-
tions."
24
To address the limitations of this type of approach, Robert C. Roberts
defines an emotion as predicated on not only a proposition but also a concern-
based construal of its significance. While the propositional element remains
cognitive, the construal is not. As Roberts explains, "Construals have an im-
mediacy reminiscent of sense perception. They are impressions, ways things
appear to the subject; they are experiences and not just judgments or thoughts
or beliefs. '25 The construals can be voluntary or involuntary, conscious or
unconscious, but they are always subjective and involve grasping one thing in
terms of something else. 26 Roberts therefore refers to a construal as "seeing-
as" because it is "an 'in-terms-of' experience based in a concern."
27
Applying this framework, Roberts defines fear as "Xpresents an aver-
sive possibility of a significant degree of probability; may X or its aversive
consequences be avoided. 28 Roberts' definition begins with the proposition
that an aversive event is possible. The presence of fear does not turn on the
accuracy of the statistical estimation. Nor is it necessary that the object of fear
be dangerous; instead, it can simply be undesirable. So, Roberts chooses the
word "aversive" rather than "harmful." Finally, the propositional element
requires that the aversive condition be significantly and not just remotely
possible.29 The proposition that an aversive event is possible triggers a con-
cer-based construal. This concern is "a desire to avoid the thing feared or a
desire to avoid the consequences that figure in the subject's reasons for his
fear."'30 This wish to avoid the feared object "sometimes, but not always, [will
lead to] a desire to act so as to avoid either the object or its consequences." 31
22. Id. at 1133-34.
23. RACHMAN, supra note 5, at 62.
24. Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 2002 (2001).
25. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 75.
26. Id. at 76.
27. Id. at 68, 73.
28. Id. at 195.
29. Id. at 193-94.
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This framework can be readily applied to Givens' letter. When he describes
"getting bad feelings," he believes that there is a substantial possibility that he
will lose his life in Iraq. He wants to avoid not only the danger of his death
but its aversive consequences for his family. This leads to a desire to act, and
though he ultimately is not able to avoid being killed, he writes a letter that
mitigates at least some of the hardships for his wife and children.
Both Sunstein's cognitivist view and Roberts' effort to go beyond pure
cognition offer ways to understand Givens' fear. Still, whatever the approach,
law may seem to have little relevance to this emotional experience. As Giv-
ens writes the letter and tucks it away among his belongings, he appears to
inhabit a purely private epistemological universe. Yet, nothing could be fur-
ther from the truth. Even when Givens is not sure whether anyone else will
read his words, his emotional plan is the product of social experiences, and
law is implicated in the cognitive universe that defines his fear. As I have
explained elsewhere:
[F]eelings are learned reactions, not just biological states of
arousal. Emotional sensations like fear result from socialization
that links physiological responses to acceptable cognitive under-
standings and courses of action. Through this process, emotions
become not simply individual conditions but products of collective
normative judgments. After all, there are relatively few states of
arousal, but there are many ways of labeling them as fear, love, an-
ger, joy, envy, sympathy, or hate. Far from being captives of a "felt
perturbation," people are active participants in "the ordering, se-
lecting, and interpreting work upon which ... acts of management
of fragments of life depend." Emotional scripts educate individuals
about what they feel, when they act, and when they restrain them-
selves. These scripts in turn reflect a sociopolitical economy of
emotion that assigns people a place in the status hierarchy by di-
recting them to adopt the emotional deference of subordinates or to
enjoy the privilege of expressing their feelings freely.32
Returning to Givens' letter, it seems likely that he is constrained by bat-
tlefield etiquette from expressing his fear freely. S.J. Rachman has noted that
"[a]dmissions of fear are discouraged in wartime, '33 and it is undoubtedly no
accident that Givens confides his fear in a letter that no one may ever read.
Even then, he describes this emotion only briefly at the beginning as a "bad
feeling" before moving on to more socially acceptable expressions of love
and concern for his family. The need to hide his fear marks Givens as an
emotional subordinate, someone who must manage his emotions for the bene-
fit of others. These others presumably include not just the family he is seek-
32. Moran, supra note 20, at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).
33. RACHMAN, supra note 5, at 2.
2004] 1019
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ing to protect but also his fellow soldiers who are spared his anxiety when it
is expressed privately in a letter. Givens has followed the emotional script of
the "good soldier" who stoically faces danger largely without complaint.
Though law does not directly regulate his thoughts, emotions, or expression
in the letter, it indirectly shapes what he is capable of imagining, feeling, and
saying. He defines his emotional connections through the legal institution of
marriage and family, and he feels regret because he must do his legal duty as
an enlisted man and therefore write a letter that he "did not want to have to
write." Even in what seems like a purely interior moment, Givens' emotions
are shaped by social, political, and cultural assumptions. These assumptions
in turn are reflected in and reinforced by the law.
II. A LETTER OPENED:
THE INTERPERSONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EMOTION
After Pfc. Jesse Givens died, his letter was delivered to his grieving
family. When his wife read the message and shared it with their children, the
significance of his expression of sentiment changed. No longer was Givens
writing just to satisfy himself that he had an emotional insurance plan in the
event of his death. Instead, that event had materialized, and his fear and long-
ing were communicated to his loved ones. Emotion had moved from the
realm of a primarily private experience to the sphere of intimate relationships.
In small-scale, interpersonal settings, the debate over emotion takes on a
somewhat different character. Here, social psychology emerges as a signifi-
cant source of insight, for sentiment plays a role not just in structuring an
individual's subjective understanding of the world but in shaping the texture
of relationships that signal status, power, and social distance, among other
things.34 People experience emotions in groups in ways that they would not
were they alone. As mentioned previously, studies of soldiers in combat show
that they often demonstrate their solidarity and sense of shared fate by sup-
pressing expressions of fear. Moreover, a soldier's subjective experience of
fear can be altered by the behavior of others, particularly leaders, as they cope
with physical danger.35 Just as fear by contagion can operate, "[t]here is con-
sistent evidence that membership in a small, cohesive group can play an im-
portant part in controlling fear" and "most people appear to be more suscepti-
ble to fear when they are alone." 36 On the battlefield, even experienced com-
34. CANDACE CLARK, MISERY AND COMPANY: SYMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE
226-51 (1997); Theodore D. Kemper, Predicting Emotions from Social Relations, 54
Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 330, 333-34 (1991); Rachel F. Moran, Law and Emotion, Love and
Hate, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 747, 749 (2001).
35. See supra notes 23 and 33 and accompanying text.
36. RACHMAN, supra note 5, at 59.
1020 [Vol. 69
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bat veterans perform worse and surrender more readily when they are isolated
than when they are part of a team.
37
As noted earlier, some cognitive theorists explain these group effects by
arguing that other people provide cues about danger. The result is the social
amplification of risk as informational and reputational cascades generate
38widely shared perceptions of a hazard. Yet, soldiers themselves offer a
somewhat different account, one that depends heavily on shared social norms
and obligations in a sociopolitical economy of emotion. A World War I vet-
eran, describing how he became confused and panicked when he found him-
self alone and wounded, reflected:
I suppose that courage is mainly, if not wholly, the result of vanity
or pride. When one is in action--especially when one is responsi-
ble for men under one's command-proper behaviour, even acts of
gallantry, are part of the show. One moves and behaves almost
automatically as a member of a team or an actor on the stage. But
now it was all over; I was alone and nobody could see me. There
was no need to keep up appearances, and I was very frightened.39
Social psychologists readily acknowledge that cognitive factors play a
significant role in explaining fear.40 Yet, their views depart from those of
information processing theorists. When rational risk assessment is the ideal,
heuristics are merely a concession to the complexity of everyday life and the
need for mental shortcuts. Because the information processing approach
equates fear with distorted risk perceptions, this emotion becomes nothing but
lapsed thinking.4 Once emotion moves from the realm of information proc-
essing to interpersonal relations, however, a narrowly individualistic, rational
approach can be criticized precisely because it fails to account for reciprocal
obligations and shared responsibilities. In his battlefield story, the World War
I veteran describes his sense of duty to his fellow soldiers, a duty that requires
him to perform "acts of gallantry." Givens, in his letter to his wife and chil-
dren, feels compelled to advise them of his "bad feelings" and send a letter
posthumously because he has assumed a special responsibility to them
through marriage and parenthood. As a result, he actually feels that he must
apologize for his own death: "I am sorry. I did not want to have to write this
letter." He even goes on to beg his wife's forgiveness: "Please find it in your
heart to forgive me for leaving you alone. . . ." These feelings surely reflect a
37. Id.
38. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
39. HAROLD MACMILLAN, WINDS OF CHANGE 1914-1939, at 89-90 (1966). See
also WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE MYSTERY OF COURAGE 180-81 (2000) (describing
examples of courage and cowardice on the battlefield and the group dynamics that
sometimes play a role).
40. See, e.g., RACHMAN, supra note 5, at 321-22.
41. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
2004] 1021
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sense of obligation that has little to do with an unadorned rational processing
of information. Indeed, Givens' expression of remorse might well seem irra-
tional, for he seems to have had little control over his fate.
Even so, Givens' mixed feelings of fear, love, and remorse probably do
not strike most readers as surprising or strange. The widespread understand-
ing of his letter suggests that in interpersonal settings, people do not judge
emotions like fear by applying the metric of rationality, here defined as accu-
rate risk assessment. These small social circles make the emphasis on strict
rationality in estimating physical risk seem especially inapt. Instead, people
evaluate the propriety of a particular sentiment based on the social and cul-
tural context in which it is expressed. 42 The shift from the interior to the in-
terpersonal domain creates new challenges. People must move beyond their
own emotional experience to make sense of the sentiments of others. Ration-
ality alone will not suffice to make these intersubjective judgments. David
Pugmire argues that individuals must rely not just on strict propositional logic
but on metaphorical thinking to bridge this experiential divide.43 As he ex-
plains, "[m]etaphors for feelings contrive to be expressive without being con-
fessional. Metaphors can give voice to feelings without trying to describe
them as private objects. For, the objects alluded to are neither undisclosable
nor situated in some private space.' As a result, metaphors are judged not
for their truth but for their aptness.
4 5
The work of philosopher Peter Goldie is particularly instructive in
evaluating the aptness of sentiment.46 He takes to task "propositional emo-
tions," which reduce sentiments to beliefs and attitudes that can be analyzed
in rational or syllogistic fashion.4 7 In Goldie's view, such narrowly cognitive
accounts are doubtful because the constitutive beliefs and attitudes can be
held with or without emotion.48 According to Goldie, "[m]uch philosophical
work on the emotions tends to over-intellectualize emotional thought, feeling,
and action, seeking to force them into the mould of a rationalizing explana-
tion when often the best one can hope for is an explanation which makes
them intelligible. ' 49 In this, he is in basic agreement with Gabriele Taylor,
who observes that explanations for emotional states need not be constrained
42. See CLARK, supra note 34, at 229-36 (describing the role of "microhierar-
chies" and "micropolitics" in the expression and management of emotion in and
among families, friends, and co-workers).
43. PUGMIRE, supra note 3, at 97-103.
44. Id. at 97.
45. Id. at 101-02.
46. GOLDIE, supra note 3, at 48-49.
47. Id. at 38. In using the term "propositional emotion," Goldie draws on the
work of Donald Davidson, Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride, reprinted in DONALD
DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 277-90 (1980).
48. GOLDIE, supra note 3, at 39. A similar point has been made by Eric Posner in
critiquing Sunstein's approach to fear. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
49. GOLDIE, supra note 3, at 3.
[Vol. 691022
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by a normative rationality. Rather, "[t]he appeal is no longer to the wholly
rational being; it is to the admittedly far less neat and precise notion of what it
would be human and natural for a person to feel under certain circumstances,
given that person's relevant other beliefs and attitudes."50 In addition to the
intelligibility of an emotion, Goldie identifies considerations of appropriate-
ness and proportionality that "have ethical dimensions which go beyond mere
questions of rationality, and which allow for considerable cultural variation
through the education of the emotions. ''s In his view, people learn the appro-
priate and proportionate responses to a perceived state of affairs through their
upbringing, as they witness the reactions of others. Someone who is badly
brought up can respond inappropriately by "recogniz[ing] situations as emo-
tion-invoking but... respond[ing] in quite a different sort of way to how the
rest of us are brought up." 52 Alternatively, "someone can be brought up badly
in another way: to respond in the same sort of way as the rest of us, that is
with the same sort of emotion, but disproportionately." 3
To apply this framework in evaluating the emotions of others, an ob-
server must "piece together or fill in the gaps in the person's narrative by
bringing to light the episodes of the emotion in a way which will make the
best sense of this part of his life."54 Although the rationality and logic at the
core of propositional emotion are impersonal, Goldie treats emotion as nor-
mative and personal. To penetrate another's point of view, acts of imagina-
tion as well as reason are required. Two of the most important forms of
imagination involve: (1) putting one's self in another's shoes; and (2) envi-
sioning what another's experience is like in those circumstances. These two
approaches differ in a significant respect. The first allows the individual to
project his or her own personal characteristics into the scenario that triggered
another's emotion. The second demands that the individual adopt as closely
as possible the characteristics of the other in evaluating the emotional re-
sponse.55 When asked what they would do in the same situation, people need
a comprehensive description of the event that triggered the emotion. Yet,
when people must imagine what another would do in that situation, they have
to know not only about the event but also about the other's personal history,
character, and disposition.56 The two approaches can yield quite different
results when "characterization goes deep, as [Goldie] put[s] it: this is where a
person's characterization substantially affects his way of thinking, reasoning,
and feeling." 57
50. GABRIELE TAYLOR, PRIDE, SHAME, AND GUILT: EMOTIONS OF SELF-
ASSESSMENT 14 (1985).
51. GOLDIE, supra note 3, at 3.
52. Id. at 34.
53. Id. at 35.
54. Id. at 177.
55. Id. at 178-79.
56. Id. at 197-99.
57. Id. at 179.
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To understand the difference, consider the following experiment by
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.58 The subjects are asked which of two
people is more upset, Mr. Crane or Mr. Tees.59 All that they know about the
two men is that they arrived at the airport thirty minutes after the scheduled
departure time for their flight.60 Mr. Crane learned that his flight left on time,
while Mr. Tees discovered that his flight was late and he missed it by only
five minutes.61 Ninety-six percent of the subjects indicate that Mr. Tees is
more upset than Mr. Crane. 62 In reaching this conclusion, the subjects know
nothing about Mr. Crane's or Mr. Tees' personal characteristics except that
they are men who fly on planes.63 So, the conclusion that Mr. Tees is more
upset than Mr. Crane depends almost entirely on the description of the con-
temporaneous event.64 As a result, the subjects must imagine themselves in
Mr. Crane's and Mr. Tees' positions, rather than trying to envision the char-
acteristics of the fictional travelers and how they would experience missing
their flights.65
The shift to an interpersonal setting raises new questions about the rela-
tionship between law and emotion. In interpersonal settings, Goldie argues
that emotions must be evaluated in holistic, not merely rational or syllogistic
form. Moreover, he suggests that both reason and imagination have a place in
understanding another's emotions. Does this framework have any application
to legal proceedings or does it venture too far afield from strict rationality to
be relevant? In fact, the common law already makes allowances for a reason-
able fear that is not necessarily rational. Juries apply this principle of reason-
ableness when relationships go sour by looking at whether a fear was intelli-
gible, appropriate, and proportional under the circumstances. Under a defini-
tion that equates fear with a distorted perception of risk, rational fear is an
oxymoron; yet, reasonable fear is a wholly comprehensible concept under the
common law.
Take, for example, "the battered woman's defense," which allows bat-
tered women who kill an abusive partner to present evidence on a history of
domestic violence. Nearly all states now recognize the defense, but its appli-
cation differs depending on the jurisdiction.66 In some places, the defense can
absolve a woman of guilt, while in others it diminishes responsibility and
58. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982).






65. GOLDIE, supra note 3, at 200-01.
66. Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87
CAL. L. REv. 943, 977-78 (1999).
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leads to a reduced sentence.67 Some states allow a jury to weigh the evidence
of battering without expert testimony, while others require such testimony to
establish the defense.68 Most controversial is the decision by some jurisdic-
tions to permit a woman to raise the defense even when she kills her husband
or boyfriend in his sleep.69
These jurisdictional differences reflect distinct views about how fear
should be defined when it is presented as a legal defense to murder. In some
states, a reasonable fear must be rational to be relevant. Under this view, the
history of abuse helps the jury to assess the accuracy of a woman's perception
of risk. 71 Battered women have a more sophisticated understanding of the
danger than someone who has not experienced abuse because "local knowl-
edge" specific to these relationships alerts them to hazards that others might
fail to perceive. 72 The history of abuse is not offered to enable the jury to
understand the battered woman's subjective emotional state. Rather, informa-
tion about past battering improves the jury's capacity to decide whether the
perception that the abuser posed a threat was accurate, that is, rational.73
Here, an information processing approach suffices to define the parameters of
the battered woman's defense.
In other jurisdictions, a reasonable fear need not be rational.74 The de-
fense can be used even when the perception that the abuser poses a risk of
imminent harm is faulty.75 Expert testimony on the psychopathology of bat-
tered woman's syndrome is admitted to show how repeated episodes of vio-
lence lead to "learned helplessness" and diminished self-esteem. 76 As a result,
victims feel like captives of the abuse with no way to escape. The killing oc-
curs when the woman is pushed beyond her endurance, loses it, and reacts to
67. See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and
Conceptual Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 377-83 (1998); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITr. L. REv. 477, 492-94 (1996).
68. David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the
Age of Science, 39 ARz. L. REV. 67, 81-91 (1997); Holly Maguigan, Battered Women
and Self-defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 379, 386, 425-31 (1991).
69. Kadish, supra note 66, at 978; Maguigan, supra note 68, at 468 n.7.
70. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Self-defense and Equal Protection, 57 U. Pirr. L.
REv. 685, 688-94 (1996).
71. 1d. at 701-02.
72. Mark Kelman, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, 17 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 798, 812-14 (1991); Andrew E. Taslitz, Abuse Excuses and the Logic and
Politics of Expert Relevance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1061-63 (1998).
73. Moran, supra note 20, at 17-18.
74. See, e.g., Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered
Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REv. 973, 997 (1995).
75. Id. at 1006-07 (describing successful use of defense in these circumstances
but also noting failures in jurisdictions that require an objectively reasonable fear of
imminent danger).
76. Id. at 997-99.
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a life that seems increasingly out of control. 7 Precisely because the battered
woman has reached her limits, she can snap even when she is watching her
abuser sleep.78
This version of the defense does not ask the jury to assess the rationality
of the battered woman's thought processes. Instead, jurors are expected to
adopt her psychological perspective, given the history of abuse. They must
imagine what emotion the battered woman was experiencing given her back-
ground, character, and disposition as well as the specifics of the situation that
faced her at the moment she killed her abuser. Having done so, the jurors then
have to make a normative and personal evaluation of her emotional response:
Was it intelligible, appropriate, and proportional, always allowing for the
vantage point of the particular battered woman? If this is the task at hand and
most jurors have not themselves been victims of domestic violence, the prob-
lems of identifying emotionally with the woman on trial can seem enormous.
For this reason, expert testimony becomes essential, a way to bridge the emo-
tional distance, when the characterization goes deep.
79
All of this suggests that emotions have special significance in interper-
sonal settings, meanings that cannot be captured through a cognitive account
that turns solely on information processing. To the extent that the law recog-
nizes these normative complications, it does so largely in the context of dis-
putes among a small number of parties. The court's role is reactive, to do
justice after an alleged wrong has taken place. The common law penalizes
departures from the social and cultural norms that govern relationships among
family, friends, and strangers. Emotions become relevant as a barometer of
the quality of these connections. By forcing jurors to put themselves in an-
other's position, the court can place the dispute in the context of the ongoing
relations that triggered an act of intimate violence. By mitigating or excusing
misconduct, the law reinforces obligations of mutuality and reciprocity. So,
the reasonable fear of a battered woman serves as the legal means to recog-
nize betrayal and violation so severe as to abrogate an ethic of care and re-
spect. Emotion offers the language in which outrage is expressed and moral
judgment enforced.
77. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 128-30 (1987).
78. Beth Bjerregaard & Anita Neuberger Blowers, The Appropriateness of the
Frye Test in Determining the Admissibility of the Battered Woman Syndrome in the
Courtroom, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 4-5 (1996-97).
79. Of course, the stature of psychological experts can be diminished by battles
over the authenticity of portraits of a battered woman's subjective experience. More-
over, insofar as these experts are called in to rehabilitate a defendant who is already
perceived as morally defective, psychologists may find themselves tainted by associa-
tion with the weak, unfit, and misbegotten. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 30-31 (1963). Goldie's account of the emotions
helps to shed new light on the role of psychiatric evidence as not simply an empirical
concession to the damaged but a normative imperative of emotional life. GOLDIE,
supra note 3, at 174-75.
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III: A LETTER PUBLISHED:
EMOTION AND THE PUBLIC MOOD
When Pfc. Givens' letter was published in the New York Times, an en-
tirely new audience had the opportunity to reflect on his complex expression
of fear, regret, remorse, and love. Unlike his family, these readers were
strangers, but even so, many of them undoubtedly were moved by his letter as
I vw,. In evaluating this emotional response, it is tempting to focus on
whether it facilitates rational public choice.80 Because deliberations about
issues like the war in Iraq take place in large, impersonal settings, the nu-
anced emotional obligations of close interpersonal relationships seem irrele-
vant. Given the social distance among citizens who share a nationality but are
otherwise quite diverse,8 1 the logic of all-against-all in the relentless pursuit
of self-interest takes on an air of inevitability. Yet, as I will argue, there is a
place for emotion as more than a mere informational heuristic even in the
public realm.
For information processing theorists, the responses to Givens' letter
serve as a quick fix on a complicated issue, a way to set the public mood
when few have time to study the Iraqi conflict in depth. Political psycholo-
gists "define [the] public mood as a diffuse affective state, having distinct
positive and negative components, that citizens experience because of their
membership in a particular political community."8 2 Shaped by public events,
this mood is a "social emotion" because it arises through group attachment
rather than a more individualized experience.8 3 Even so, the public mood is
experienced by individuals in varying degrees, not by some amorphous entity
called "the public."84 So, the public mood is the product of an interior experi-
ence that in turn is mediated by affiliations to far-flung groups, like fellow
citizens in the nation-state. In contrast to small and cohesive social groups,
80. See AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 26-29 (2002) (describing
application of rational choice theory to politics).
81. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 7 (rev. ed. 1992) (describing how sovereignty is
built on an imagined community that conceives of the nation as a "horizontal com-
radeship" despite "actual inequality and exploitation"; this sense of fraternity is so
powerful that it prompts "millions of people . . . willingly to die for such limited
imaginings").
82. Wendy M. Rahn et al., A Framework for the Study of Public Mood, 17 POL.
PSYCHOL. 29, 31-32 (1996).
83. Eliot R. Smith, Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward New Conceptu-
alizations of Prejudice, in AFFECT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING: INTERACTIVE
PROCESSES IN GROUP PERCEPTION 297, 304 (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton
eds., 1993).
84. Wendy M. Rahn, Affect as Information: The Role of Public Mood in Political
Reasoning, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF
RATIONALITY 130, 133 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000).
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these identifications can be formal and abstract. However, when the salience
of national identity is heightened by events like terrorism at home and war
abroad, public mood can significantly influence private sentiment by height-
ening a sense of anxiety and distress. 5
From the standpoint of information processing, public mood is a low-
cost way for those with limited knowledge to make choices about complex
political issues. In a study of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), Wendy M. Rahn found that "despite being the focus of many pub-
lic debates, [NAFTA] had low salience to the mass public." 6 When she ana-
lyzed opinions about NAFTA, she found that public mood had a tremendous
impact when compared to other factors such as partisanship and ideology,
general knowledge, self interest, and reference groups.87 Moreover, the im-
pact was greater for those who knew relatively little about NAFTA and was
"much smaller for those people who had heard a lot about NAFTA." 88 Rahnconcludes that:
Public mood ... seems to have a greater impact on policy prefer-
ences at the lower end of the information range. For those less
knowledgeable, this general-purpose consideration may be the only
one operative. For those more informed, affective information is
just one source of many, and it only starts to lose its utility at the
very highest range of information, when partisan and other predis-
positions come to dominate.
8 9
In short, public mood need not mean that individuals ignore other informa-
tion; rather, it is a handy way to make political judgments "when other infor-
mation may be lacking or when the judgment is inherently a difficult and
complex one."
90
That said, one might wonder whether New York Times readers are typi-
cally among the better informed, so that they are unlikely to rely on the public
mood in making judgments about the war in Iraq.91 Even if this is true, this
audience may be particularly influential in setting the public mood for others,
precisely because the readership includes members who are widely perceived
as knowledgeable and sophisticated. As Sunstein would put it, these are indi-
85. Id. at 132.
86. Id. at 136.
87. Id. at 136-38.
88. Id. at 138.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 150.
91. Indeed, a study of New Haven residents during the 1980s found that New
York Times readers were better informed about the Middle East than others in the
sample. Shanto Iyengar, Shortcuts to Political Knowledge: The Role of Selective At-
tention and Accessibility, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 160, 164-65
(John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski eds., 1990).
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viduals who can strongly influence the flow of information because of reputa-
tional cascades. 92 Moreover, publication of material like Givens' letter is not
the only way that the public mood is set. The mass media can shape public
sentiment through powerful visual representations of terror and war.93 Today,
television is the dominant source of political news in the United States, 94 and
this coverage tends to provide a small amount of content accompanied by
highly evocative images. Indeed, this approach is shaped by market forces,
which require media outlets to dramatize the news in order to distinguish
themselves in the flood of information available. Or as Barry Glassner puts it,
"Television news programs survive on scares." 95 Moreover, politicians are
aware of the power of emotional messages in shaping the public mood.96
Looking back on the Persian Gulf War, Glassner contends that government
officials drummed up support for the conflict by relying on false or exagger-
ated horror stories.97 Or, as Arthur Rowse, a former editor for U.S. News and
World Report, observed, publicists readily recognized that Americans "would
be more likely to fight because of atrocity stories than because one feudal
fiefdom was invaded by another."
98
All of these accounts of fear suggest that it is an inadequate and easily
manipulated emotion that undercuts sound public choice rooted in rational
92. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
93. Consider, for example, the controversy over a Nightline program entitled The
Fallen in which newscaster Ted Koppel read the names of all American casualties in
Iraq as photographs of the deceased appeared on the screen. One broadcasting group
refused to run the show, concluding that it was an "attempt to disguise political
speech as news content" and had "no journalistic value." Tim Rutten, Regarding
Media: A Real Threat to Expression?, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 2004, at El. In response,
John MacArthur, author of SECOND FRONT: CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA IN THE
GULF WAR (1992), insisted that "Americans have a right to know what's being done
in their name. And one consequence of war is corpses. Unless you're showing
corpses, you're not showing the consequences of war. Americans can't make in-
formed decision about what to do in Iraq by censoring the reality of Iraq. It's irra-
tional." Eric Boehlert, Reality Check (May 6, 2004), available at
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/05/06/images/index4.html.
94. Press Release, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Perceptions
of Partisan Bias Seen as Growing-Especially by Democrats; Cable and Internet
Loom Large in Fragmented Political News Universe (Jan. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/pew researchinteretvoters_01 1404.pdf.
95. BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF
THE WRONG THINGS xxi (1999).
96. Victor C. Ottati & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Affect and Political Judgment, in
EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 296, 311 (Shanto Iyengar & William J.
McGuire eds., 1993) (describing how candidates rely on "feel good" political cam-
paigning to manipulate the public mood and capitalize on voters' tendencies to use
mood as information).
97. GLASSNER, supra note 95, at 154-57.
98. Arthur E. Rowse, Lapdogsfor the Pentagon, PROGRESSIVE, JULY 1992, at 38.
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discourse. By confining the role of fear to a rough proxy for complex infor-
mation, emotion once again assumes the diminished status of deficient think-
ing. Accordingly, scholars like Sunstein insist that experts should dominate
official deliberations because they can overcome popular error through the
application of scientific method.99 Under an information processing model, it
seems difficult to rehabilitate emotion in public life. To do so, one must argue
that feeling generates information in its own right, information that can be
quite valuable to the decision making process. For example, sentiment may
be a barometer of the intensity of preferences. It is true that an individual
could simply assert "I strongly favor X" or "I weakly favor X" to communi-
cate this information. Still, as political talk shows on television make plain,
shouting appears to be a relatively commonplace way of expressing the inten-
sity of beliefs, and this shouting has emotional overtones. 00 Similarly, many
activists reveal the strength of their commitment through emotional displays
at rallies and protests.
10 1
This defense of emotion in the public realm is a weak one. First, while
emotion can suggest the intensity of preference, it may not be a reliable
guide. People with equivalent degrees of commitment can have distinct emo-
tional styles, so that a stoic's small display of sentiment is highly noteworthy
and the histrionic's demonstrative behavior means very little.' °2 Moreover,
emotion can be faked for strategic reasons, including personal gain. 103 So,
individuals can affect an intensity they do not feel in order to extract a surplus
from the political process. Interestingly, there is some evidence that indiffer-
ence is quite difficult to fake successfully.'04 If true, this asymmetry could
make relying on emotion to gauge intensity of preference particularly treach-
erous. After all, there would be accurate information about those who were
largely indifferent, while there might be highly misleading information about
the distribution of strongly favorable and unfavorable positions.
99. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1166.
100. Abraham Genauer, Shouting with a Sense of Humor, THE HILL, July 23,
2003, at 38; Matt Kempner, 'Crossfire' Reloading the Ammo; New Shouters: Pioneer
Interrogation Show Changing Left- Wing Hosts, Format After Ratings Slide, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Feb. 27, 2002, at ID.
101. See Francesca Polletta, The Laws of Passion, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 467,
482-87 (2001) (book review).
102. AARON BEN-ZE'EV, THE SUBTLETY OF EMOTIONS 153-54 (2000) (noting that
differences in emotionality can reflect differences in both emotional intensity and
emotional expressivity). See also GOLDIE, supra note 3, at 99 ("[L]ack of universality
in humans' actual emotional behaviour or in their mature emotional capabilities (just
like lack of universality in language capabilities of mature individuals) is an unsur-
prising consequence of diversity in the culture and environment in which a child can
be placed....").
103. BEN-ZE'EV, supra note 102, at 182-83.
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To defend the role of emotion in the public realm, scholars have moved
beyond rationality and information processing to introduce other normative
values. For example, Paul Slovic justifies giving some weight to popular fears
by invoking a "rival rationality."' 05 According to Slovic, agencies look only
at the number of lives at stake, but the general public worries about whether
the risk is dreaded, potentially catastrophic, inequitably distributed, involun-
tary, uncontrollable, new, and faced by future generations. 0 6 As the term
"rival rationality" suggests, this normative alternative does not do away with
rationality but instead relaxes some classical theoretical assumptions. As I
have argued elsewhere, Slovic's approach fits nicely with the emergence of
behavioral law and economics.10 7 According to this school of thought, ra-
tional choice theory must be modified to account for bounded rationality,
bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest. 18 Bounded rationality refers
to the reliance on cognitive heuristics as a mental shortcut when information
is scarce or issues are complex. 10 9 Bounded rationality lies at the heart of
Sunstein's critique of fear as distorted risk perception.110 As a result, he re-
jects Slovic's call for a rival rationality because it enshrines sloppy thinking
and opens the regulatory process to "paranoia and neglect.""'
This exclusive focus on bounded rationality is a bit puzzling insofar as
Sunstein is himself a leading proponent of behavioral law and economics.
Arguably, a consideration of bounded willpower and bounded self-interest
might provide grounds for endorsing Slovic's rival rationality or at least for
not denouncing it as an unmitigated disaster for public decision making.
Bounded willpower describes "the fact that human beings often take actions
that they know to be in conflict with their own long-term interests."11 2 For
instance, people may spend money to gain immediate gratification, even
when they know they should save for the long run. Aware of their lack of
self-control, these spenders sometimes arrange for automatic deposits to a
retirement fund from their bank accounts, thereby sparing themselves the
temptation of consuming now and suffering later." 3
105. PAUL SLOVIc, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 231 (2000).
106. Id.
107. Moran, supra note 20, at 5-7.
108. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 14-16 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). See also
RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991) (exploring the limitations
of traditional rational choice theory in explaining consumer choice and financial mar-
kets).
109. Jolls et al., supra note 108, at 14-15.
110. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying notes.
111. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1123.
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Bounded self-interest reflects the fact that most people "care, or act as if
they care, about others, even strangers, in some circumstances." ' 4 That is,
norms of fairness operate to limit the untrammeled pursuit of self-interest. To
illustrate this point, proponents of behavioral law and economics point to an
experimental game in which the Proposer is asked to offer to split a sum of
money with the Responder. 15 The Responder can either accept or reject the
amount offered, but if the amount is rejected, both parties get nothing. 16 A
rational Proposer should offer the smallest figure possible (for example, a
penny), and the Responder should take it because a penny is still better than
nothing. 17 But this is not what happens." 8 Instead, Proposers are prone to
offer a much more even split of the money, and Responders turn down mea-
ger offers.1 9 In short, both parties are applying an unspoken but shared norm
of fairness.12
0
Using the framework of bounded willpower and bounded self-interest as
well as bounded rationality, Slovic's rival rationality has a newfound appeal.
As I have suggested elsewhere:
Returning to the factors that lay people weigh in evaluating risk, it
is clear that the magnitude of the harm and the likelihood that it
will materialize are both relevant considerations for rational risk
assessment, whether bounded or not. The concerns with whether a
risk is involuntary or uncontrollable implicate a sense of personal
efficacy, or willpower. And, the equitable distribution of risk as
well as its intergenerational consequences relate to norms of fair-
ness, or bounded self-interest. Had Sunstein evaluated popular in-
tuitions about danger in light of all three elements of behavioral
law and economics, he might have reached a more sanguine-or at
least more nuanced-conclusion about the normative relevance of
popular concerns to the regulatory process.121
Even so, the concessions to fear that behavioral law and economics scholars
arguably make should not be overstated. This school of thought still exists in
the shadow of rational choice theory, for it is a series of deviations from that
theory's strictest assumptions rather than an alternative normative framework
114. Id. at 16.
115. Id. at 21.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 21-22.
119. Id. at 22.
120. Id. at 21-23. It should be noted that this experimental evidence is rooted in
small, interpersonal settings, and the generalizability to public choice is simply pre-
sumed. In fact, there are reasons to question this ready extension of the meaning of
emotion, as I suggested at the outset of this Section of the essay.
121. Moran, supra note 20, at 7.
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with independent ethical principles. As Amartya Sen has observed, propo-
nents of behavioral law and economics have made an important contribution
by questioning the tendency to equate self-interest with self-centeredness.
122
In particular, they have recognized that "one can get joys and pains from
sympathy to others, and these derived joys and pains are quintessentially
one's own." 123 The recognition of bounded self-interest is critically important
to making room for alternative ethical traditions, traditions that might reha-
bilitate emotion in public life.
Building on the insight that the joys and pains of others can be felt as
one's own, scholars have searched for an emotion that captures this concept.
Kenneth Arrow argues that sympathy is an especially promising candidate for
understanding intersubjective judgments that are vital to collective choice and
shared self-governance. 24 As Arrow explains, economic theory predicts that
under certain conditions, it is impossible to move from individual preferences
to a single social ordering, a situation that he describes as "the height of bad
luck."' 125 Arrow has considered a number of ways to escape this dilemma, but
for the purposes of an exploration of law and emotion, the most significant is
his interest in sympathy as a basis for making intersubjective judgments of
utility.126 That is, emotion becomes a way to transcend one's private episte-
mological universe and gain an impression of another's experience. Arrow's
analysis has much in common with efforts to explain emotion in small inter-
personal settings, and if he is right, even in the public domain sentiment may
generate information, albeit imperfect, that is not accessible in any other way.
Moreover, this information is vital in moving from individual states of ex-
perience to social choice.1
27
While Arrow focuses on sympathy as a way out of the impossibility of
creating a stable social ordering from individual preferences, others have
addressed the role of emotion in overcoming collective action problems. One
such problem relates to dilemmas of motivation; for instance, everyone may
prefer to "free ride" on the efforts of others rather than contribute to a public
good. 28 Because each person hopes to capture the benefit without making a
contribution, too little of the good is produced. As a result, the group suffers
even though each member has behaved rationally from a narrowly self-
122. SEN, supra note 80, at 31.
123. Id.
124. Kenneth J. Arrow, Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice,
67 AM. ECON. REV. 219 (1977).
125. 1 KENNETH J. ARROW, The Principle of Rationality in Collective Decisions,
in COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: SOCIAL CHOICE AND JUSTICE 45, 51
(1983).
126. Arrow, supra note 124, at 224-25.
127. See SEN, supra note 80, at 338-43.
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interested standpoint. 129 This classic account of rational but ultimately coun-
terproductive choice is not borne out by empirical evidence. Instead, as Dan
M. Kahan argues, people develop an emotionally nuanced logic of reciproc-
ity:
When they perceive that others are behaving cooperatively, indi-
viduals are moved by honor, altruism, and like dispositions to con-
tribute to public goods even without the inducement of material in-
centives. When, in contrast, they perceive that others are shirking
or otherwise taking advantage of them, individuals are moved by
resentment and pride to withhold their own cooperation and even
to engage in personally costly forms of retaliation.
130
Kahan argues that this logic of reciprocity should substantially alter the way
that law and policy address collective action problems by promoting trust as
well as dispensing material incentives.131 He concludes that a logic of recip-
rocity poses strong challenges to the conventional wisdom of public choice
theory, which equates citizens with self-interested wealth maximizers and
ignores the public spiritedness rooted in goodwill and cooperation.'32
Another problem relates to difficulties of coordination. These problems
arise when "each person wants to coordinate with others but there can be
considerable disagreement about how to coordinate."'133 That is, a person's
decision about whether to participate depends entirely on what others do; for
instance, a person may want to go to a park only when it is not crowded, or
someone may want to purchase an item of clothing only if it is trendy and
popular, that is, if lots of others are buying it, too.' 34 Just as Kahan argues that
personal relationships of trust can mitigate collective action problems, social
networks can help to solve coordination problems. The success of networks in
this regard depends on whether they consist of strong or weak links. 135 As
Michael Suk-Young Chwe explains, "[iln a weak-link network, the friends of
a given person's friends tend not to be that person's friends, whereas in a
strong-link network, friends of friends tend to be friends."' 36 Because friend-
ships take time to develop and sustain, strong links generate groups that grow
slowly, while weak links produce groups that grow rapidly. An intimate circle
129. Id. at 1-2.
130. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law,
102 MICH. L. REv. 71, 71 (2003).
131. Id. at 76-77.
132. Id. at 99-101.
133. See MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG CHWE, RATIONAL RITUAL: CULTURE,
COORDINATION, AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE 12 (2001).
134. Id. at 5, 12, 37-60.
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of friends is likely to be relatively closed, while a network of acquaintances
can include a wide range of people.' 37 As a result,
communication is slower in the strong-link network in that as you
get information from friends, then friends of friends, then friends
of friends of friends, and so on, even by the fourth iteration, you
still only get information from about one-third of the people. In the
weak-link network, by four iterations you get information from
almost everyone.138
Based on this account, weak-link networks should be superior to strong-
link networks in coordinating group action, yet just the opposite seems to be
true.' 39 According to Doug McAdam, this puzzling result can be explained by
positing that strong links and weak links operate in fundamentally different
ways. In his view, weak links are better at diffusing information, but strong
links are superior at influencing behavior. 14 Strong links are a conduit not
just for information but also for influence and feelings. 42 These sentiments
create a sense of trust that enables individuals to act, confident in their belief
that others will do the same. 143 In fact, research on mass politics consistently
reveals that "[a] primary satisfaction of political activists derives from the
friendships and collegial activities of political life rather than any abstract
political motives." 144 Apparently, not only does this solidarity motivate indi-
viduals to participate but it also assures them that others will participate as
well.
Chwe takes issue with McAdam's account, arguing that strong links are
more effective at communication because the parties share common knowl-
edge, that is, "each person knows that there is enough collective sentiment to
make group action possible."'' 14 What is key for Chwe is that in a strong-link
network
your friends are likely to be my friends, and the eagerness to par-
ticipate among our group of friends would be common knowledge
among us. If you and I are connected by a weak link, I don't know
your friends and you don't know mine. In other words, the idea
137. Id. at 61-62.
138. Id. at 62.
139. Id. at 63.
140. Doug McAdam, Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom
Summer, 92 AM. J. SOC. 64, 79-81 (1986).
141. Id. at 80.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLITICS: KNOWLEDGE AND
OPINION IN THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE I (1986).
145. CHWE, supra note 133, at 64.
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that weak links are always better for communication relies on the
assumption that communication is about "first-order" knowledge
only and not about knowledge of what others know.
146
Chwe insists that his account is based on "'cold' rationality,"'147 yet he also
concedes that common knowledge "is substantially related to issues of inter-
subjectivity, collective consciousness, and group identity.' 148 In fact, while
the knowledge may turn on shared beliefs, the sense that it creates a common
bond may depend on emotional connections. Under either McAdam's or
Chwe's account, then, the success of social networks in coordinating group
action is rooted in mutual identification, a process mediated at least in part by
feelings.
Just as small-scale relationships make it necessary to imagine one's self
in the other's position, these theorists argue that collective choice and action
require intersubjective judgments. The process of adopting another's perspec-
tive is undoubtedly complicated by the substantial scale and social distance
inherent in public deliberations and decision making. For this reason, officials
can not simply assume that interpersonal judgments or cohesive social net-
works will easily lead to a discourse that transcends self-interest and demon-
strates a genuine regard for others. As Amartya Sen notes, "[t]he introduction
of interpersonal comparisons is more than a 'way out' of impossibility; it is
also a 'way in,' linking up normative social choice theory to ethical traditions
that go back a long way and that have received a good deal of critical atten-
tion in recent philosophical discussions. ' 149 These traditions create public
norms that require a democratic state to cultivate as well as to reflect the citi-
zenry's capacity for sympathy, even in settings that force individuals to imag-
ine another's experience across profound experiential divides.
The work of Martha Nussbaum draws on these traditions, arguing that
emotions can be a source of moral intuition, a part of the ethical discourse
that guides deliberations in a liberal democracy.150 Nussbaum is preoccupied
not with fear but with compassion, an emotion that bears more than a passing
resemblance to what Arrow terms "sympathy." For Nussbaum, compassion is
defined by three propositions: the suffering of another is profound and not
trivial; the suffering is undeserved; and the suffering will affect one's own
flourishing.' 5' She distinguishes between an individual psychology of com-
passion and its incorporation into the design of institutions. For her, the rela-
tionship is "a two-way street: compassionate individuals construct institutions
146. Id. at 65.
147. Id. at 4.
148. Id. at 95.
149. SEN, supra note 80, at 338.
150. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF
EMOTIONS 401-54 (2001).
151. Id. at 306-21.
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that embody what they imagine; and institutions, in turn, influence the devel-
opment of compassion in individuals."' 52 In arguing that compassion should
play a role in public discourse, she notes that "all emotions are not equal" but
compassion occupies a place of fundamental importance in an ethical society
because of the judgments it entails.153
What Nussbaum's analysis suggests is that the move to the public do-
main does not automatically make emotion either an irrelevant or a harmful
consideration. Instead, the potential for emotion to play a constructive role
depends heavily on how it is incorporated into official institutions. A senti-
ment like fear certainly can be manipulated, but without a sense of compas-
sion, public discourse can become empty and effete. When Pfc. Jesse Givens'
letter was published in the New York Times, it communicated his fear to a
broad audience, yet what his message sparked may well have been compas-
sion. Readers understood that his suffering was profound and undeserved and
that his untimely death fell within the boundaries of their concern. For, Giv-
ens and other young men and women in the armed forces have died in the
name of their fellow Americans, whose collective exercise of power has
placed them in jeopardy in a foreign land. Under these circumstances, it is
essential that the citizenry be reminded of what soldiers and their loved ones
are suffering. After all, if the polity cannot imagine their point of view, it may
not be able to make an ethical judgment about whether the political gain has
been worth the personal sacrifice.
CONCLUSION
This has been a story of fear in three parts: as a private experience, as an
interpersonal communication, and as a public event. I have argued that in
each instance, different theories of emotion become relevant, but at no point
does the significance of sentiment disappear. As Pfc. Givens' letter suggests,
at the core of all the theorizing is a basic feature of human experience, the
capacity not just to think but to feel. As emotion moves from the realm of
private experience to interpersonal communication to public event, the chal-
lenge is to understand the meaning of emotional life not just for ourselves but
for others. The feats of imagination that are required will not always be suc-
cessful. For instance, we may never know precisely how Givens felt when he
wrote his letter or how his wife and children felt when they read it. Yet, I
would argue, we are all better for the attempt if it reminds us of our shared
human condition.
152. Id. at 405.
153. Id. at 453.
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